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A Question of Endings 
 
Lawrence Kimmel 
 
Prefatory Remark 
 
   What is the nature and meaning of death?  As a 
philosophical question, the answer is surely, as it is for every 
such question: “It depends.”  On the context of the asker, 
among other things: social, cultural, historical, 
existential…whether young or old, whether under duress or 
at leisure, whether in harms way or secure, whether in pain 
or depression or in the bloom of health.  We are inclined to 
think of death, abstractly as well as referentially, as an event, 
something that happens, or as a state, something that has 
happened.  So inclined we expect an objective response to a 
neutral question: one lives for a given length of time and 
then one dies.  But there is a depth to the question of death 
that invites coherent resolution rather than abstract 
conjecture; its source is the passion of imagination rather 
than a measure of reason. Our most intimate concern and 
what makes the question both acute and deep is the 
awareness of the inevitability of our own death. It is only 
here that imagination fully engages the frustrating mystery 
and resistant logic of absolute limits.  Whether the personal 
question of identity and destiny is foremost on an agenda of 
inquiry into the nature and meaning of death, it is the 
background of every inquiry:  We would know the complete 
sense of our lives which includes our death.  In knowing that 
we are going to die, it is an insistent and further need of our 
nature to know what it is to die.  Death is the final paradox 
on the far reaches of self knowledge.  This is the setting of 
our question, the force of our desire to know.  The problem 
of course is that death is nothing, or rather, a something that 
cannot be known, nor can we desist from pursuing the 
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question.  If philosophy begins in wonder, wonder comes up 
against the limits of its possibility in death. 
 
I 
 
“What kind of world is this anyway? Why not 
make fewer barnacle larvae and give them a 
decent chance?...the sea is a cup of death and the 
land is a stained altar stone…If an aphid lays a 
million eggs, several might survive…It’s a 
wretched system.”   --Annie Dillard    
 
   Is it a wretched system?  Is life a bad deal given the cost?  
It is, of course, the only deal so the question is moot. That 
doesn’t still the impulse to complain, however, or in our best 
days under the apple bough, to sing in our chains like the 
sea.  A parallel to Dillard’s grievance is found in John 
Barth’s familiar modern myth “Night Sea Journey” in which 
creatures thrashing through the night sea speculate about 
their situation, their maker, their destiny, and their journey 
swimming toward some rumored distant shore.  Millions die 
in the process, yet they keep on thrashing, occasionally 
crying out ‘Love!’, ‘Love!’, until the narrator at last alone, 
sole survivor of all who began is drawn  into a rushing final 
surge to the shore, toward Her in whom some mindless 
destiny is to be fulfilled.  But with his last breath he 
pronounces his blasphemous desire and hope that all who 
come after will find the grace of denial of this heritage, and 
so be spared the meaningless, mindless repetition that claims 
such carnage.  The key to the mythic parable, if one is 
needed, is realizing that the narrator is a spermatozoon, the 
vital element of continuance in a drama that echoes Dillard’s 
conclusion: it’s a wretched system.   
   Barth’s message concerning oppressive cycles of suffering 
is an echo of the philosophical pessimism of Schopenhauer 
who’s recommended denial of the will is an acknowledged 
poor second alternative given in the counsel of Silenus: 
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‘Better not to have been born at all!’  Compared with the 
anguish of being alive the stillness and oblivion of death 
seems a consummation devoutly to be wished.  While 
Schopenhauer finds the system no less wretched than 
Dillard, Nietzsche’s rejection of the pessimism of his teacher 
offers a more positive view of the matter: while 
acknowledging that Nature is extravagant in its waste, he 
celebrates the glory and abundant fecundity of life. 
 
   Familiar expressions in both Hebraic and 
Greek scriptures record the cycles of human life 
from a god’s eye view: 
As for man, his days are as grass. As a flower of 
the field, so he flourishes. For the wind passes 
over it, and it is gone, and the place thereof shall 
know it no more.  
(Old Testament, Psalm 103) 
 
   As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men. 
The wind scatters the leaves to the ground: the 
vigorous forest puts forth others, and they grow 
in the spring season. Soon one generation of men 
comes and another ceases.  
(Iliad, Book VI) 
 
   Whether lament, anger, or exultation, whether recorded in 
naturalistic or poetic terms, the human response to this 
dissolute cycle of life and death in which animals feed on 
animals, brothers murder brothers, and all living things are 
consumed in death, has found expression from the earliest 
literature in which rage and sorrow speak to the cost of life 
in death, and particularly of the consciousness of death in 
life.  The very horror of the spectacle that Dillard depicts 
along with the inevitable sentence foreseen by everyman is a 
common occasion for the pretence that it is not there.  
Literature on the other hand, as exemplified by Dillard’ 
remark, has made a tradition of assembling reminders that it 
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is there, seeking to discover especially in the sacrificial lives 
of men and dying gods, not a justification of the system, but 
some semblance of meaning in our subjection to it. 
    ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth… formed 
man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath 
of life…’  The codicil however, is ‘…dust thou art and unto 
dust return.’  So goes the story in a few short chapters of 
Genesis: beginning and end, non-being-to-non-being, earth-
to-earth.  So told, the life of man is but a dust that stirs, and 
settles.  But what interests us most in this telling is what 
happens east of Eden among the residuals of creation 
suffering the ensuing curse of death.  In violating the 
conditions of Eden Man gains knowledge of good and evil in 
innocence overcome, but at what terrible price? In the 
moment of negotiation with the serpent everything is 
changed: the wages of existence are now suffering and death.  
Once this story is told, the simple passage of being into non-
being becomes intolerable. For better or worse, the narrative 
is no longer God’s but Man’s. God’s occasional voice 
eventually becomes silent, and there remains only the sound 
of creatures bound to the seasons of the earth. The problem 
of Adam in Eden that spawns the temporality of the earth-
born frames the consciousness of human existence.  The 
ensuing riddle of death is without final resolution, or perhaps 
death is the final resolution—not an answer, simply an end to 
the question.  Part of the point of the story of Eden is that 
Man chose death (albeit in the promise of the knowledge of 
good and evil).  The literature of human culture has in a 
sense been a troubled discernment of just what it is that was 
chosen.   
   The question of death pervades the arts; and its most 
powerful expressions leave the question open.  Typical of the 
Vanitas tradition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries by 
painters like Felicien Rops, Max Klinger and Paul Cesar 
Helleu is a picture of a beautiful woman in a ball gown at a 
vanity table before a mirror. Our first impression is to be 
drawn into the beauty of the woman, but a second perception 
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shifts to a larger gestalt of the whole painting—a boney skull 
of death.  A rabbit/duck shift in perspective, only here the 
elision in perception is beauty/death.  This graphic paradox 
of death in life allows us to make inferences about beauty 
and brevity, construct interpretations about vanity and time, 
but there is no answer, really—only the question of death 
remains in the silence of the frame.  There is fullness to the 
silence of death yoked with beauty—a visual analogue to the 
poet’s lament that…after many a summer/ dies the swan. 
   Death, wherever, however, and whenever it occurs is the 
boundary of consciousness and life, and in the ordinary 
discourse of life we are at a loss about the meaning of such 
absolute limits. On further reflection and for the individual 
concerned, the limit of consciousness is only a question 
mark. I am the whole of my existence, but most of all I am 
this particular, acute consciousness independent of whatever 
descriptions or prescriptions befall the accoutrements of my 
body. Beyond this there is nothing—or rather, it is a nothing 
consciousness cannot assimilate.   
   Consciousness, common to every human life, nonetheless 
has stages. Eden is the world of childhood, a time of forever 
in which nobody dies.  East of Arcadia however, is the 
fateful world of choice caught in the grip of the paradox of 
life in death/ death in life that has been the passion of 
creative imagination in world literature.  If love is the primal 
energy of literature, death is the crucible in which it is 
formed—the ground, limit, and full stop of inquiries into the 
meaning of life.  In the metabolism of nature we can trace 
the life energy of leaves back to the branches, through the 
trunk to the roots and to the earth, which itself is the fecund 
remains of leaf, branch, trunk and root that sustain the cycle 
of life from death, earth to earth.  The woods decay and 
weep their burden to the earth, and the earth yields new life.  
We can track the mystery of this cycle, but the hiatus of 
consciousness remains a mystery unto itself. 
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II 
 
   Wisdom yields perhaps only the words and worlds of old 
men, in which no child believes, just as the child has hopes 
and fears the old can no longer remember.  It is well to 
remind ourselves that as there are stages in the perception in 
life, so too are there stages in the perception of death.  Youth 
is endowed with an aggressive energy in which passion 
engages competition and is fulfilled in production and 
possession. The fires are banked in the aged, who more 
passively accept and appreciate the passing occurrences of 
life.  If death means nothing to the child, it means only risk 
for the young.  Living with death is a gradual learning of age 
that brings refinement of perception as diminished 
compensation for loss.  This is to say that there are different 
ways of dying as well as living and different perspectives on 
both relative to stages in life and positions in culture.  The 
modern European dies no more than lives in the way of his 
ancestors.  There may be an interest in an analysis of 
historical differences along with differences among living 
cultures, but here the point is only to mark the fact that it is 
so. 
   Fictive literature which celebrates differences also seeks to 
discern in each concrete instance of difference an intuition of 
universal meaning, under the presumption that whatever lies 
beyond the bourn from which no traveler returns, we are all 
joined as fellow travelers.  ‘Never send to know for whom 
the bell tolls…’ is a poetic conceit within a particular culture, 
but a sound can be found in every culture to announce the 
meaning of this measured inevitability.  Consciousness is the 
sustaining current of human existence, but however we 
choose to live or die we are creatures caught in the web of 
time, and we know it in our most intimate and alone 
moments. 
   There is a story, possibly apocryphal, of a last conversation 
between Alice B. Toklas and Gertrude Stein as her life 
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companion was lying in bed dying of stomach cancer.  
Gertrude asked quietly “Alice…Alice…what is the answer?”  
Her friend replied.  “I don’t know, Gertrude.”  Later, 
Gertrude spoke again, more faintly:  “Alice…what is the 
question?”  Stein, philosophical to the end was also plain to a 
fault, and there is no reason to think this was not a genuine 
question— a question she puts to herself: it is a question that 
is an answer which remains a question.  Inquiring into the 
question of death, we need less an answer—or what is surely 
the case, many answers—than a deep and sustained 
reflection on the question. But what is the question?  What 
are we asking, to whom, and why?  Judging from the 
diversity of the literature on death, there is no general answer 
and perhaps no single question in the asking.  The rule in 
philosophy that one should never attempt to answer a 
question until she fully understands the question applies 
here.   
   There is a line from scripture in the liturgical music of the 
Mass: “Be not afraid…for I am with you always…”  It is a 
line that may or may not carry the weight of promise and 
reassurance for anyone hearing it.  Some in the congregation 
will hear the words as syllables sung to a familiar tune, but 
there will be someone at Mass for whom these words will be 
personal, intense, and utterly necessary.  We are each at 
different places in our lives and worlds, and not everything 
makes sense or is meaningful independently, and just so.  
The same is surely true about any script, any question, any 
answer, including and perhaps especially the question of 
death.  Death is not a question, or not in question for a child, 
and though it may become a pressing question for those in 
harms way or the very old, it may or may not be framed in 
pain, sorrow or terror. If there exists no neutral context in 
which to put this question, what philosophical inquiry is 
possible?  In an earlier essay in volume one of this series I 
analyzed the idea that death is nothing, in the sense that it is 
not a possible experience in one’s life.  People die, of course, 
and death is a meaningful word, but to understand the 
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limiting concept requires a comprehensive view of the many 
disciplines and discourses which surround it, and in its 
various contexts of use.  What is death?  Is there one 
question here or a thousand?  And, in philosophical terms, to 
whom but ourselves do we put the question?  And in which 
case, what is it we don’t know in our asking?  The most 
general and pointed response seems to be that my ultimate 
concern is not with your death, or anyone’s death, but my 
own: this is the question the meaning of which I want to 
understand. 
   A philosophical investigation of the question begins by 
allowing the question to take hold of imagination.  So 
understood the question of death—my death—is such that 
theoretical investigation is irrelevant, and if speculation is 
idle, how do we proceed?  Wittgenstein recommends as a 
test and corrective to vacuous philosophical questions that 
we first ask ourselves: Why am I asking the question?  What 
don’t I know?  What do I want?  If the question is genuine, 
then what is it that I am fearful or hopeful about that this 
question may bring to the surface?  Such are the issues, 
confronting us, I think.  Perhaps the question of death can 
only be personal, and it will be personal in different ways for 
the same person in different circumstances, and at different 
stages of her life.  It may be useful at this juncture to point 
out that the appeal and force of fictive literature is to find in 
such personal moments and concrete circumstances, 
intuitions that will resonate with emotional and spiritual 
needs and perceptions that transcend their individual 
expression. If this is so, it is appropriate for our purposes to 
draw on the non-theoretical, non-explanatory discourse that 
has addressed itself to the issue of death from the beginnings 
of human thought.    The approach of literature to such 
questions comes in the form of an invitation to share in the 
experience of the writer.  Like the question of faith, a 
response to the intimacy of death is more like bearing 
witness to feelings and shared perspective than that of 
discovering or reporting some independent truth.  The 
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understanding we want requires the engagement, then, of 
creative imagination.  Thought, in the absence of 
imagination is abstraction; imagination is experiential.  If 
death as the limiting frame of consciousness is not a possible 
experience, our only resource of understanding is 
imagination, which again confirms the domain of 
philosophical inquiry. But, still, if there is no possible 
experience, what is it I am then to imagine?  I can imagine 
being a bug, a rock, a plant, an angel—indeed familiar 
characters in literature—but in every case to so imagine is to 
attribute consciousness to the thing I become: consciousness 
is a necessary condition of intelligibility in such imaginative 
metamorphosis.  Each of these is an experiential possibility 
through imagination, so exists as possibility in a way which 
imagining my death does not. 
 
III 
 
   Confronting one’s own death in imagination is a signature 
issue in existential literature, expressed as a confrontation 
with nothingness.  Sartre’s philosophical analysis of this 
confrontation may seem contrived, but contextual 
descriptions in his fiction are remarkable in their intuitional 
disclosures.  The arts in general may present our best 
opportunity to inquire into the question of death in the full 
openness of imagination.  In the philosophical novel—
Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, Proust—the nature of death often 
becomes transparent within the complex personal 
relationships among characters over the space of the novel.  
Poetry strives for a greater intimacy of expression in framing 
a concrete image, metaphor, or analogy—following an 
intuition of the sort, for example, that in the nothingness of 
death, the mind seems drawn into the density and darkness of 
what is observed in space as a Black Hole.   In its death 
throes, a star it implodes upon itself to become a darkness so 
dense that it absorbs all passing light, and from which no 
light escapes. The blackness is not empty but fully imploded 
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space, a complete condensation of light, hence the paradox: 
the color of light is black  On analogy with death, there can 
be no experience of this, no inside looking out, it is an 
enigma: whatever we learn of it is by analogy, inference, 
indirection, and the expressions of metaphor. The 
imaginative experience of death, on this analogy, is being 
drawn into the density of such darkness, a conception of 
consciousness imploding on itself.  My example is a pale 
analytic of the dramatic force of poetic discourse, obviously, 
but perhaps the point will be clear anyhow. 
   It is the special province of the poetic imagination to 
capture the acute intimacy of death in such condensed form. 
The philosophical difficulty consists in the extremity of the 
margins of experience—a problem of sense: it is less the 
strangeness of the unknown than the inaccessibility of the 
unknowable.  As death is an impossible experience, what is 
the imagination to lock onto, in trading off knowledge for 
understanding?  There are apparently no limits to the creative 
impulse of the arts, with the understanding that the resulting 
expressions at best yield sense, not truth—or if truth, then it 
is a truth of the heart immune from verification.  An 
alternative within literature to the condensed crystallization 
of emotion in poetic metaphor is found, for example, in 
Tolstoy’s Ivan Illich, which investigates the emotional 
response of an individual to the awareness of impending 
death, describing anxiety, denial, regret, anger, fear, 
humiliation…and final acceptance.  This is a painful and 
moving portrait of an individual life approaching its end, an 
examination of the life-consciousness of an individual person 
as he resists the gradual realization that he is dying. 
   In either case, in life and in literature, the problem of 
imagination concerning death itself, the inner sense of the 
reality of it, remains.  I can imagine dying, the process, but it 
is another kind of logic required to imagine being dead. It is 
clearly possible to imagine my family, my colleagues and 
friends, the university, etc. going on (as it will) without me.  
But imagining this with the emotional import of experience, 
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entails that I become a spectator.  The content of this image 
is held in my continued perception of things.  I can imagine 
being killed, but again consciousness continues even as my 
body is broken to pieces amid the disintegrating wreckage of 
the airplane.    
   There are two related ideas that we are contending with: 
death as end—of life, of consciousness; and death as a 
limit—of understanding, of consciousness 
In the First Critique, Kant argues or rather simply 
acknowledges that at a certain point reason comes up against 
its own limits.   In discussing the antinomies, and later 
distinguishing the phenomenal and nouminal, Kant outlines 
the incorrigible and absolute limits of the understanding. For 
example on the question of the beginning of existence—the 
juncture of nothing/ then something—we are inclined several 
contradictory ways—that something must have existed 
always, as against the impossibility of a beginning ex nihilo; 
but then we are left with the idea of infinite time—indeed 
that a infinite period of time has already elapsed.  We are 
impelled to make claims that cannot be established, 
confronted by equally plausible and contradictory claims that 
are equally indeterminate, yet there must be an answer.  It is 
natural and compelling for human beings to want a rational 
picture of the world and of human existence that is 
understandable.  But it is also clear that knowledge cannot 
satisfy that need.  Kant waxes uncharacteristically eloquent 
and resorts to metaphor in this section of the First Critique, 
in which he pictures sensibility as an island surrounded by 
the raging seas of unintelligibility, filled only with illusions 
of a distant shore.   
   Kant’s conclusion and counsel is that we simply abandon 
the attempt to see the universe as a whole, sub specie 
aeternitatis.  The absolute limits of reason with respect to the 
existence of the universe in time and space, are analogous, of 
course to the absolute limits of consciousness, with respect 
to individual in life and death.  As death is a limit to life and 
experience, it is also a limit to understanding.  I cannot 
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comprehend my existence from outside my existence, so 
imagination must find other resources for understanding 
these limits.  Kierkegaard gives an existential twist to the 
same point, speaking of the absurdity of the mind trying to 
think what cannot be thought. He has in mind not only the 
transcendental conceits of Hegel, but of the ordinary human 
being confronting her own existence, aspiring to know what 
is not within the domain of knowledge. Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical argument cites the additional modality and 
movement of faith which opens the possibility not for 
rational understanding, but for existential resolution.  The 
force of this suggestion is the idea that the question of death 
is an appeal not to thought and reason, but to imagination 
and passion, and can be answered only in the paradox life.  
Pascal has a similar view in his insistence that the heart has 
reasons which reason does not know.  Such resolution is 
committed to the idea that existence is more fundamental 
than knowledge and that the total human consciousness is 
not comprehended in reason, but finds extension in 
imagination.  
 
IV 
 
   But what does it mean to say that the answer to the 
question of death as an absolute limit cannot be answered in 
thought, only in the living experience of imagination?  It 
seems we once again come full circle to where we began, 
with a question within a question.  And having made this 
circle, what more do we understand about our own death?  It 
is hardly enlightening to say we can only live in the 
imaginative experience our own death.  Even that is a 
confusing way to put it.  At most it returns us once again to 
the surrogate domain of fictive literature which makes 
experience of other lives possible within creative 
imagination, and provides the resource of metaphor to bridge 
if not transcend the antinomies of reason. 
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   Heidegger’s concept of human being as being unto death, 
requires—in order to become fully alive—that the individual 
cease the pretence of anonymity with respect to death. To 
acknowledge that “one dies”, is for Heidegger a way of 
putting oneself and others at ease about death.  He cites 
Tolstoi’s account in Ivan Ilyich as exemplary of the idea that 
it is only in confronting the reality of one’s own death that 
one becomes fully alive, authentically human.  Heidegger 
insists that anxiety is a necessary mode of realization that 
discovers the meaning of life in the concrete particularity and 
consciousness of one’s own death.  However, it is not clear 
that crisis is a requisite condition of realization either of 
one’s own death, or of authentic existence.  If Plato’s 
account is to be believed, the death of Socrates shows no 
anxiety in confronting death; his calm demeanor is possibly 
explained as philosophically distanced, but the particularity 
of the circumstances attests to genuine courage and argues 
against the anonymity of death. 
   Sartre, opposing Heidegger’s idea of being unto death, and 
so the notion that it is death that gives meaning to life, insists 
rather that death is that which on principle removes all 
meaning from life. Sartre is struck instead by the 
determinations of chance at the heart of every project, and 
the heart of chance is the variable if inevitable fact that death 
may at any point reduce human potential and possibility to 
absurdity.  At still another positive extreme, Holderlin, in his 
poem To the Fates, provides a poetic affirmation that 
requires neither definitive knowledge or supplemental 
assurance, such that a single summer that ripens into a single 
autumn in the accomplishment of the hearts project is 
enough to welcome the stillness of the shadow world: having 
once lived like the gods in the fullness of life’s power, 
nothing more is needed.  In this case, death is welcomed 
soberly, not from pain, not in anxiety, not with resentment, 
or in the expectation of any promise of transcendence, but in 
simple gratitude for the fullness of life. 
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   Images and metaphors of death in literature are of course 
drawn from life however we may try to extend them beyond 
that source.  In addition to the variability of individual and 
cultural values that make death a litany of differences, it 
should also be noted that the modern temper is constituted in 
a radically secular age that lacks anything resembling 
genuine conviction in immortality.  However many among 
us may be given to a rhetoric and profession of hope in 
eternity, the operational values that serve as the currency of 
culture attest to the fact that death is a wall not a window to 
eternity.  No longer conceiving of life against a background 
of eternity, time becomes foreshortened in death, and the 
density of individuated experiences become proxy for an 
extenuation of life.  As death is not a passing through time 
into eternity, it becomes, in the temper of the age, a truncated 
occasion for sensuous moments that sustain immediacy. 
   Images of death in the visual arts have remained variable in 
symbolic depiction, both allegorical and realistic—the 
hooded figure with scythe, sand sifting through the hour 
glass, the carnage of war, the putrefied corpse.  The world of 
art is graced with exemption from argument or explanation 
and free from the expectation of closure.  In the power of its 
expression death remains an open and elemental question 
within the mystery of creation. 
   As a child during the great world war my first recollection 
of death was abstract and distant.  Later, engaged as a 
participant in another war, death became commonplace and 
immediate.  Much later, disengaged as a reluctant witness to 
nightly television coverage of yet another war, I learned yet 
another aspect of death.  .  Death at a remove in war, 
however real, remains an abstract thing. Even as a child 
listening to the hushed voices of the women as they gathered 
around the radio at night to hear news of the war, I sensed 
but not did not understand the fear of death that held them in 
bondage.  Many years later, asking my young children to 
leave the room as the television gloried in the continuing 
trauma of body-counts in a despised war; the numbers alone 
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muted the visceral reality of death.  In war itself, killing 
fields scatter carnage in a routine that deadens the heart and 
numbs the brain to the reality of death.  At 70 years of age, 
after suffering a heart attack, two spinal surgeries, open-heart 
surgery and the loss of many close friends and family, it is 
not difficult to remember the many different and shifting 
perspectives of death that have been part of my own journey 
in life.  We learn of death in a thousand different ways as we 
walk through the valley of shadows; it is never the same. 
   If a child is lucky, her first intimate sense of the reality of 
death for may come from the loss of a pet.  My first born was 
5 years old when he first encountered death.  We had two 
alligators adopted from his Montessori pre-school when the 
teacher that owned them moved away.  The Caymans were 
named Joe and Sally.  We had them for almost a year when 
one morning I heard Bret cry out, and I went to find him 
staring in anguish into the tank where Sally was floating 
belly up.  As a single parent with two small children, whom I 
had to get to day-care and pre-school before I went to meet 
my first class of the day, I said that we must take Sally out of 
the tank, and bury her in the back yard by the fence.  I 
wrapped Sally in a cloth, got a shovel and went with two 
boys ages 5 and 3 out to the back of our property to bury 
Sally.  The three year old said that Sally would not like the 
dirt, that she couldn’t breathe, and we should get a box for 
her.  The 5 year old was still in tears, grieving.  I felt the 
need to come up with some explanation for all this.  
Unfortunately I decided on the abstract account, that nothing 
in the universe is ever destroyed, only transference of matter 
and energy.  Sally, in the earth would become the life energy 
to sustain other life. It seemed like a good story and we all 
went on to our day.  More than a year later, I was awakened 
in the night by the crying of one of the children. I went into 
their bedroom and found Bret waking from a nightmare.  I 
asked what was wrong, and in the grip of a painful anxiety 
he replied “I don’t want to die”.  I explained that I, his father 
would live for many, many years, and then eventually I 
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would die, and then he would live on for many, many years, 
so he had nothing to worry about right now.  That, again, 
seemed, albeit from a not very intelligent adult perspective, 
reasonable reassurance.  I asked, “Now, what is it you are 
really afraid of?” and he said, in tearful misery: “I don’t want 
to become a Banana plant.”  It took a moment to remember 
that the place we had buried Sally almost two years before 
was beneath some banana trees.  In retrospect, I should 
probably have told him that Sally had died and had gone to 
live with Jesus in heaven.  
   The point of this story is about telling stories, and perhaps 
acknowledging differences in perception, including the limits 
of a child at a concrete operational stage of development.  
But the larger point is there is always and only a story to be 
told and it is a critical question to ask who will be able to 
understand a particular telling.  It is hard to imagine a master 
narrative that that will clarify, much less answer the question 
of death for everyone.   
   Recall that Aristotle accounts for life in terms of the form 
of the soul: the living plant has a nutritive soul, the animal an 
animate soul, the human being a rational soul.  When we 
remark that only human being die, we mean, of course, that 
we are the creatures who know we are going to die, it 
pervades our living.  Death comes not only to the 
Archbishop but to the humble peasant.  Animals also are 
killed and die out, their life forms disintegrating into the 
aether.  What stories of death comprehend the whole of 
life—of plants, of animals, of mountains, no less than of 
Man?   This question brings us full circle and back through 
Dillard to the point of the terrible intimacy of our bargain 
with life—in the realization that the end of every story is the 
uncertain truth that death holds dominion.  The story of your 
own life, the life you are living—that within which you are a 
character just as you are the narrator that sustains the world 
of that character—comes to an end and trails off.  As I am 
my world and my life the world of my consciousness, there 
is a critical sense in which the world ends in my dying.      
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   In our allotment of time, and within the literature and 
litanies of death, we search for expressions of this final and 
mysterious intimacy in which we are all brought together, 
but 
Voices only falter in failing light,  
Drawn into tides and winds of night, 
Bleed into resounding grave  
Where mind and calling meet  
In the bleak morning gray. 
 
   In death, there are no final answers only continuing 
questions, no theories that yield truth, only stories that search 
out sense, only the grace of creative imagination that sustains 
the meaning of our lives within death’s limit.  And that, as 
Joyce reminds us, is the he and the she of it. 
 
Lawrence Kimmel 
Trinity University 
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